This paper analyzes the effects of intrastate water reallocation on agricultural productivity. Specifically, I look at the 1976 Krishna Water Dispute Tribunal that reallocated the rights of three Indian states over the Krishna River. I exploit districttime variation in access to water to obtain causal effects of water reallocation on crop output and yield. I find that on average, the decision reduces district output by 7.7 percent and yield by 5.5 percent. The weak negative net effects of the decision are comprised of productivity gains for the most downstream state, Andhra Pradesh, that are more than offset by the productivity losses for the upstream states Maharashtra and Karnataka. The negative impacts for Maharashtra, which are especially pronounced during periods of drought, are significant at conventional significance levels. Thus, the 1976 reallocation of state rights over water from the Krishna Basin was redistributive and weakly reduced overall efficiency.
"I have witnessed the conversion of my land from a water abundant country to a water stressed country." -Vandana Shiva, Water Wars: Privatization, Pollution and Profit

Introduction
River waters have long been the basis of conflict, both nationally and internationally.
Usually the downstream parties demand more access to the river; their upstream counterparts tend to have more control over the river. Conflicts intensify when parties decide to build projects (canals, dams) on the rivers and/or their tributaries, thus blocking the water's natural flow (Iyer, 2007) . In India, water wars have been waged for centuries. The Cauvery River dispute has been going on since 1892, conflict over the Indus River between India and Pakistan began when India was partitioned right after its Independence in 1947, and the Farakka Water treaty between India and Bangladesh with respect to the Ganges River was brought up in the 1970s. The dispute over the Krishna River among the three riparian states has ensued since the early 1900s, and despite many attempts to settle it, a binding agreement was not in place until 1976; this 1976 agreement is the subject of this paper. 1 These redistribution rules abide by the concept of equitable appropriation which states that the river is to be viewed as common property and that the concerned parties will be allocated water on various factors that include the geography of the basin, the hydrology of the basin, climate, economic and social needs of the basin and population. India has its own set of doctrines to resolve disputes: the Interstate Water Disputes Act of 1956, which allows state governments to complain regarding river waters, and the National Water Policy of 1987 and 2002, which recognizes a river basin as the primary unit for water resources development and management.
Reallocating water among states involves redistribution, typically from upstream parties (who usually have better access to the water) to downstream parties. It is theoretically ambiguous whether on net, efficiency increases; this depends on whether the marginal productivity of water is higher upstream or downstream. Assessing which party has higher marginal productivity can be difficult, since the incentives to invest can change after reallocation. In agriculture, for example, a change in water rights might change investments in irrigation and cropping patterns, among other things. The literature with respect to water allocation and water management more generally is interdisciplinary and has been largely descriptive (Section 2.2 provides a discussion of the related literature). Though claims have been made about the depletion of water and the potential negative consequences for productivity, and case studies exist about productivity declines due to water reallocation 2 , there are no studies that rigorously evaluate the effect of reallocation of state rights over water on agricultural productivity. This paper attempts to fill this gap by analyzing the impact of one particular water reallocation in India on agricultural productivity: the allocation of the Krishna Basin waters decided by the Krishna Water Dispute Tribunal (KWDT) in 1976. The evaluation of this water reallocation is of interest for several reasons. 2 In the matter of the Cauvery Water dispute, the downstream state of Tamil Nadu has always extensively used the river water for its irrigation, while Karnataka, the upstream state, started late with its irrigation and has extensively controlled the flow of water to the downstream areas. This has been associated with a productivity loss in the Thanjavore district in Tamil Nadu, which is one of the largest producers of paddy in the basin. However, it is difficult to attach a causal interpretation to this observed reduction in productivity, as there could be secular time changes in productivity unrelated to Karnataka's control of water upstream.
The Krishna Basin is one of the largest river basins in India, located in three states that collectively make up one-fifth of India's total population. Understanding the effect of the 1976 Tribunal decision is therefore important to the region, and could help policymakers design policies that raise food supplies, raise efficiency, or reduce poverty. The experience in Krishna Basin could illuminate issues in reallocation of water rights that others in India and outside it could learn from as they contend with their own water disputes.
To identify the effect of the 1976 water reallocation on agricultural productivity, I
take advantage of district-time variation in exposure to the decision. In particular, only after 1976 is the water reallocation in effect, and moreover, it is the districts located adjacent to the Krishna Basin whose access to water could be changed due to the water reallocation. This enables me to use a difference-in-differences strategy in which the change over time in agricultural productivity in the districts adjacent to the basin in excess of the change in districts located farther out is interpreted as the effect of the 1976 water reallocation. In the presence of differential trends in agricultural outcomes between the districts located closer and farther from the Krishna Basin, the difference-in-differences estimate would not give the effect of the water reallocation. Thus, in my preferred specification below, I control for district-specific time trends.
I apply this difference-in-differences strategy to a district panel data set covering all 63 districts of the three concerned states for the period of 1971-1999. My main finding is that the decision reduces agricultural productivity, though this is not significant at any conventional levels. I also look at the effect of the decision during drought periods, and find a negative (however not statistically significant) net effect on agricultural productivity; although the magnitude of the effect is higher than that of non-drought periods. When I allow heterogeneity in effect of the decision by state, I find that the decision increases productivity in the most downstream state, Andhra Pradesh, reduces productivity in the two upstream states, Maharashtra and Karnataka. The negative impacts for Maharashtra, which are especially pronounced during periods of drought, are significant at conventional significance levels. Taken together, these results indicate that the 1976 reallocation of state rights over water from the Krishna Basin was redistributive (with Andhra Pradesh gaining at the expense of its upstream neighbors) and weakly reduced overall efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background on the Krishna Water Dispute Tribunal, followed by a brief discussion of the related literature.
Section 3 explains the theoretical framework for thinking about the impact of the water reallocation and elaborates on the empirical strategy. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the estimation results and I conclude in Section 6.
Background
The Krishna Water Dispute Tribunal
The Krishna River is the second largest river in Peninsular India. It rises from the Western Ghats near Mahabaleshwar and flows eastwards into the Bay of Bengal. The Krishna Basin spreads over 99,980 square miles (258,000 km 2 ) across three states:
Maharashtra (upper riparian), Karnataka (middle riparian) and Andhra Pradesh (lower riparian). 3 The basin is further divided into 12 sub-basins. Figure 1 shows a map of the basin and the sub-basins. The Southwest Monsoon that spans from June to September/October is the main source of water in the basin. Canal irrigation is the primary method of irrigation, followed by tanks and wells. The soil in the region is primarily black soil and alluvial soil.
The main crops of the basin are jowar, bajra, cotton, paddy and sugarcane.
The Krishna Basin has witnessed conflict between upstream and downstream parties for centuries. Most of the dispute has focused on which state has primary rights over the water, and also on various projects that were built on the river, thus curbing the natural flow of the river. The decision was finalized in 1976 and henceforth became binding on the three states. 6 The intent of the Tribunal was to increase equity amongst the three states involved in the dispute, while maintaining as well as possible individual state's efficient use of water in agricultural productivity.
5 Dependable flow is "the magnitude of river flow which may be assuredly expected at a given point on the river on some scientific or rational basis inspiring confidence" (Krishna Water Dispute Tribunal, 1973a, page 74). There are two approaches to calculate dependable flow; runoff and stream flow. Runoff is rainfall that is not absorbed by the soil finding its way into the river channel. River discharge (also sometimes called stream flow) is the volume rate of water flow (the residual amount available in a drainage basin). Stream flow was the preferred method of estimation since it also represents the integrated results of all meteorological and hydrological factors operative in the drainage basin and is the only phase of the cycle for which reasonably accurate measurements can be made of the volumes involved (Bruce and Clark, 1976) . Discharge was calculated at the Bezawada (Vijayawada) site in Andhra Pradesh and the percentage dependability of the Krishna River at Vijayawada was calculated to be 75%, which works out to 2060 TMC. 6 In addition to the above allocation (also known as Scheme A of the KWDT), Scheme B of the KWDT determined the distribution of the surplus water in the basin. The surplus was determined to be 330 TMC, and was to be divided thus, 25% to Maharashtra, 50% to Karnataka and 25% to Andhra Pradesh. However, the implementation of this Scheme required the constitution of the Krishna River Valley Authority, which was never realized. Thus, Andhra Pradesh was given access to use any surplus waters, but could not claim rights to it. (Biggs et al., 2007 and . 8 It is an important station since it was the site primarily used to make the rulings of the allocation, and moreover, it is where the river forms the Krishna Delta and flows into the sea. Figure 2 shows the location of the station.
To examine the effect of the Tribunal's decision on the flow of water, I perform a simple before-after analysis (unfortunately, given the data available, it is not possible to separate the true effect of the decision on water flow from changes in water flow that would have occurred over time irrespective of the decision). variance of discharge have decreased in the post-1976 period. This is corroborated by the regression analysis of Table 1 . All specifications include rainfall as a control variable since rainfall is an important source of water in the basin. In Column 1, monthly discharge is the dependent variable, and I find that on average discharge significantly decreases after the Tribunal decision. In Column 2, I look at average monthly discharge over each calendar year and still find a significant decline in discharge in the post-water reallocation period.
Columns 3 and 4 relate to within-year fluctuations in discharge rather than the level of discharge. Column 3 shows that discharge significantly decreases in all months except the summer months. 9 The discharge significantly increases in the summer months after the decision (the point estimate is 1.189 = -7.492 + 8.681 and is significant at the 5% level of confidence). This suggests that during the drier part of the year, there is more water flow than what would be expected if the decline in level of discharge in Columns 1 and 2 applied uniformly across months. This is in line with the research by Biggs et al. (2007 Biggs et al. ( , 2008 and Venot et al. (2007) . The KWDT had defined a typical water year as June 1 st to May 31 st each year. One potential explanation of the increase in discharge during the summer months could be that the upstream states were trying to meet the allocations towards the end of the water year, which coincidentally falls during the summer months. However, it is also consistent with upstream states releasing more water when the downstream is drier for other reasons, such as increased pressure to release water when supply is naturally low downstream.
Column 4 explicitly shows that the variance of discharge declines in Vijayawada after the Tribunal decision.
While the results of research suggests that the Krishna Basin is facing water shortage (hence the lower flows perhaps), however during times of higher demand for water (in the analysis, the summer months) it appears that more water is being released from upstream, leading to more stable water flows throughout the year.
Related Literature
A large literature has focused on the provision of common pool resources and public goods. There are broadly two things that these papers focus on: the need for cooperation among parties who are beneficiaries to the resources and the control aspect of it. Ostrom (2003) finds that some ownership rights towards common pool resources can result in effective governing and managing of systems. 10 Boucher and Branoillé (2010) provide evidence of cooperation at the country level. They argue that contributors to a public good increase participation but lower parties' efforts when there is uncertainty.
The other set of literature has highlighted provision of public goods based on who controls these goods. Banerjee and Somanathan (2006) discuss how public goods are allocated by a centralized state and note that politically disadvantaged groups have also been able to extract public resources from the state; however, it is not the same across all minority groups. Besley and Coate (2003) suggest that sharing costs in a centralized system clouds efficient policy making since it does not keep local needs into account. 11 A handful of other studies examine the relationship between property rights allocation and economic efficiency. Besley and Ghatak (2010) theorize that for a non-binding resource constraint, improving property rights of an insecure asset involved in the production process (e.g. land) can improve economic efficiency. Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2002) find evidence of an increase in agricultural productivity when tenants have more secure land rights. Bardhan (2000) finds that usually, rich farmers violate water allocation rules within an irrigation community. He also points out that obedience might not be an indicator of cooperation among farmers since they might be better off without the rules.
Also related to my study is research in the area of hydrology that has been done on the Krishna Basin. 12 One focus of this research has been about the closing of the river, i.e., it can no longer sustain any large irrigation projects since its efficiency has reached a maximum. In addition to the research presented by Venot (2008) Adding to the problem of overuse is the issue of low quality irrigation techniques in the basin. Wallach (1984) points out that in the Krishna Basin, although cultivated land grew over 80% (post-independence in 1947 to the 1970s), water had not reached most parts due to leaky canals. Shah (2005) finds that groundwater irrigation is being heavily exhausted because of lack of good canals, tube wells and irrigation and hence allocation schemes are by and large wasted because of faulty irrigation methods. A handful of studies have also focused on the efficiency of dam constructions on rivers. Duflo and Pande (2007) find that dams increase agricultural productivity and reduce vulnerability against rainfall shocks in the districts downstream from where dams are built. On the other hand, Gamage and Smakhtin (2009) suggest that large-scale expansion of dams and barrages over the rivers have reduced flow into the sea. They focus on the Krishna Basin and note that upstream reservoir storage developments are to blame for this.
The main contribution of my paper is that I quantify the effects of redistribution of state rights over water within an entire basin, over an extended period of time. In particular, I
look at the impact of the 1976 Krishna Water Dispute Tribunal decision that shifted state rights over water from the Krishna Basin. My research tries to link the literature on the use of water in agricultural production and the research on property rights (in my case water rights).
To my knowledge, it is the first study on the effects of court-ordered water distributions on agricultural outcomes.
Empirical Strategy
Conceptual Framework
A simple model where states are treated as profit-maximizing firms can provide a useful framework for understanding what could be the impact of a redistribution of state rights over water. 13 Consider two states (upstream and downstream) that share a river basin.
Suppose the total amount of water in the river is ̅. Each state maximizes profit with respect to water
where is the profit, f (w) is a concave production function (f'(w)>0 , f"(w) <0), p is output price and c(w) is the cost function and is non-decreasing in water. For simplicity let us 13 State governments and their politicians may well have other objectives, but profit maximization nevertheless provides a useful reference point.
assume that the cost of production is just the net cost of controlling the water. To maximize profits, each state will produce output where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, i.e., ( ) ( ). Upstream has first access to water, and so it will use water until the marginal profit from using the additional unit of water is zero; let w u denote the profit- Let y denote the total output in the region. Without any allocation rules, each state maximizes its own profit, and the total output is:
If states behaved jointly, total output would be:
and given the concavity of the production function it can be seen that > . Thus, for the region as a whole, there is an increase in output. . At point A, the upstream maximizes its total profit where marginal benefit is zero,
given the current amount of water it uses, . Point B is where downstream produces given amount of water. If they were to jointly make the output decision, i.e., where marginal benefits are equalized, they would produce at point C, with upstream using and downstream using . Thus, the upstream state decreases output moving from stand-alone to joint profit maximization, the downstream state increases output, and output increases overall.
To summarize, in the case where the resource constraint is binding, a reallocation of water from an area of lower marginal productivity of water to an area of higher marginal productivity of water is predicted to raise overall output and yield (with the higher marginal productivity area gaining in output and the lower marginal productivity one losing in output).
However, it is theoretically possible that water reallocation might lead to lower output. This would happen if water were reallocated from a higher marginal productivity area to a lower marginal productivity area. While this is not something a profit maximizing decision-maker would intentionally do, this could arise for sensible reasons. For example, the equitable appropriations guideline for solving water disputes stipulates that decision-makers consider equity as an important goal, and decision-makers who weigh equity heavily in their social welfare function more may well redistribute water in favor of the lower marginal productivity party. Also, allocation decisions are being made under imperfect information about each state's marginal productivities, hence even decision-makers who care only about efficiency could ex post have reallocated to lower productivity areas.
Additionally, in theory, the effect of the water reallocation could have zero impact on output. This is consistent with several scenarios. First, the resource constraint may not be binding-the water that the upstream state left for downstream use may exceed the optimal amount demanded by the downstream state. In my empirical analysis below, I allow the effect of the allocation to vary between drought and non-drought periods in the region; the rationale is that the resource constraint is more likely to be binding during a drought period than a non-drought period. Second, the allocations may not be enforced, in which again nothing changes from the pre-decision situation of each state maximizing its own profit.
Also, if there were already some private bargaining in place prior to the 1976 water reallocation, then this reallocation would not achieve any efficiency increase and the net effect of the allocation would be zero.
Given the foregoing discussion, it is theoretically ambiguous what the effect of the reallocation of states' rights over the Krishna Basin is on agricultural productivity. Next, I
describe my methodology for identifying the causal effect of water reallocation.
Identification Strategy
The decision of the Krishna Water Dispute Tribunal redistributes rights over water from the Krishna River among the three states bordering it. There are two sources of variation in exposure to this water reallocation. On the one hand, there is time variation: the decision is effective beginning in 1976. On the other hand, there is cross-sectional variation, with the water reallocation affecting the water access of districts located closer to the Krishna River. Using the time variation alone would not permit identification of the causal effect of the water allocation because agricultural outcomes would have differed before and after 1976 even without the reallocation. As well, using the cross-district variation alone would not permit identification of the causal effect because the districts adjacent to the Krishna River are different from the farther away districts in ways that affect the outcomes (e.g., water availability, soil type, topography). Therefore, I exploit both sources using a difference-indifferences identification strategy.
Specifically, I estimate the effect of water reallocation by taking the after-before difference in outcomes for the districts located inside the Krishna Basin (i.e., adjacent to the basin; below, I refer to these as "inside" districts), and subtracting out the after-before difference in outcomes for districts located outside the basin to remove the secular time effect. This strategy is summarized by the following equation:
where y dt is a measure of agricultural productivity of district d in time t, post t is a dummy variable for observations in years 1976 or later, inside d is a dummy variable for the districts located inside the Krishna Basin, rainfall dt is the rainfall shock, is district fixed effects, is year fixed effects, and ε dt is the error term. The coefficient of primary interest is β 1 , which is the difference-in-differences estimate. 14 In order to interpret this coefficient as the effect of the 1976 decision reallocating states' rights over the Krishna Basin, the parallel trend 14 Compared to the raw difference-in-differences estimate, which is (mean y for inside districts after 1976 minus mean y for inside districts before 1976)-(mean y for outside districts after 1976 minus mean y for outside districts before 1976), this one controls for main effects more fully (time dummies are more detailed than controlling just for a "post" dummy, and district dummies are more detailed than controlling for just an "inside" dummy) and for rainfall. assumption must hold: in the absence of the water reallocation policy, the change over time in productivity in the inside districts would have been the same as the change over time in productivity in the outside districts.
The district panel data I use for my empirical analysis has several years of pre-1976 data to permit explicitly controlling for differential trends. One method I use is to control for a time trend that is specific to the inside districts:
A second method controls for district-specific time trends, which is a more exhaustive control for differential trends than what is encapsulated by Equation 2:
The difference-in-differences estimates in Equations 2 and 3 provide the effect of the water reallocation even if there is a differential trend between districts closer to and farther from the Krishna Basin, so long as the differential trend that would have applied in the post-1976 period mirrors the recent historical trend. Gradual expansion of irrigation, or gradual adoption of new agricultural technologies like high yield variety seeds, are two important forces underlying trends in agricultural productivity in Maharashtra, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh over this time period, hence these inside-specific and district-specific time trends credibly capture much of the differential time effects between inside and outside districts.
If the water allocations stipulated by the 1976 decision are not binding, then we do not expect the decision to have any impact. For example, there may be enough water for everyone, and so productivity does not change. During droughts, there is likely to be excess demand for water, and the allocations are more likely to be binding. Therefore, I modify the previous models to incorporate heterogeneity in effect by drought and non-drought periods.
A district-year is classified as under drought if the rainfall shock in that year falls below the 20 th percentile of rainfall shock in the three states. When a district's own rainfall is below expectation, then demand for water from other sources (such as the Krishna Basin) is especially high. It is an empirical question whether the water reallocation on the whole mitigates or amplifies the harmful effects of drought on agricultural productivity. For downstream districts, the harmful effects could be mitigated because the water reallocation assures a steady release of water from upstream (subject to the annual and monthly flows stipulated in the decision). However, for upstream districts, the very same steady releases of water could amplify the harmful effects of drought because at their highest time of need for non-rain sources of water, they may need to release some water to abide by the decision. To assess whether the water reallocation on net changes the effect of droughts on agricultural productivity, I estimate the following equation:
where drought dt is a dummy variable for district d having a drought at time t. β 1 gives the effect of the water reallocation on agricultural productivity during non-drought periods, and β 2 gives the differential effect during drought periods. A positive β 2 would suggest that on net, the water reallocation mitigates the harm of droughts, while a negative β 2 would suggest that on net, the water reallocation amplifies the harm of droughts (which would be an unintended consequence.
The analysis has thus far focused on estimating net effects of the water redistribution across the three states involved in the decision. This is of primary interest because this answers the question of whether the policy raised efficiency. However, given that the decision basically redistributes water from upstream state Maharashtra to downstream states Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, it is also of interest to assess which states gain and which lose (if any). Therefore I modify Equations 1 to 4 to allow for state-specific effects of the water reallocation.
Data
I implement my identification strategy using a district panel data set that is used by Duflo and Pande (2007) . 15 The dataset is an extension of the Evenson and McKinsey India Agriculture and Climate dataset (Evenson and McKinsey, 1999 but still provides a good number of before and after years of data.
The two main measures of agricultural productivity that I use are total production and total yield. Total production, measured in rupees per thousand tons, is the value of the production of the main crops (at average crop prices in 1960-65). Total yield, measured as Rupees per hectare, is total production divided by cultivated area. The main crops consist of water-intensive crops (rice, sugarcane, cotton and wheat) and non-water intensive crops (bajra, jowar and pulses). Figures 5 and 6 show mean output and yield, respectively, by state and year in inside and outside districts. The average log of total production is 9.67 Rupees per thousand tons and average log of total yield is 4.12 Rupees per hectare. While output is higher in inside districts at the outset of the water reallocation, yield is similar between inside and outside districts.
Estimation Results
Effect of Water Redistribution on Agricultural Productivity
I first estimate the overall net effect of water reallocation on total production and total yield. These results are presented in Table 3 . The difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of water reallocation is given by the coefficient for the "Post*Inside" interaction term.
Column 1 reports the results of estimating Equation 1 with log total production as the dependent variable using ordinary least squares. I obtain a difference-in-differences estimate of 0.035. This coefficient is not statistically significantly different from zero at conventional confidence levels. In order to interpret this coefficient as the effect of water reallocation, the parallel trend assumption must hold: in the counterfactual where the decision did not happen, the change in output over time would have been the same in the inside districts (located adjacent to the Krishna Basin) and the outside districts (located further away). In Column 2, I
add a control for a time trend specific to inside districts (i.e., Equation 2) and obtain an adjusted difference-in-differences estimate of -0.077. 18 In Column 3, I add district-specific time trends (i.e., Equation 3), and obtain an adjusted difference-in-differences estimate of - 18 It is interesting that the coefficient decreases after adjusting for a differential trend between inside and outside districts-this suggests that in the absence of the decision, output would have grown faster in the inside region.
0.076, though neither of these estimates is significant at conventional levels of significance.
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Thus there is weak evidence that the decision reduced output. The point estimate in Column 3 indicates that the 1976 reallocation reduced annual district output by an average of 7.6 percent. The 95% confidence interval is [-0.186, 0.034] , which means that I can rule out output gains greater than 0.034 and output losses less than -0.186 at the 5% significance level. In the right panel of Table 3 , I conduct a similar analysis with log of total yield as the dependent variable. The difference-in-differences estimate is -0.008 in Column 4. The difference-in-differences estimate is -0.055 when I control for inside-specific and districtspecific linear trends (Columns 5 and 6), indicating that the 1976 reallocation reduced annual district yield by an average of 5.5 percent. The 95% confidence interval is [-0.131, 0 .021], which means that the yield losses will not be less than -0.131 and yield gains are limited to 0.021.
The main finding from Table 3 is that the water reallocation weakly reduced agricultural output and yield on net within the three states involved in the Tribunal's decision. In Table 4 , I explore whether the net effect of water reallocation differs during drought and non-drought periods. The first row shows the coefficient for the "Post*Inside" interaction, and reflects the net effect of water reallocation during non-drought periods. The second row shows the difference in effect between drought and non-drought periods (thus, the effect of water reallocation during drought periods is the sum of these two coefficients;
this figure is displayed in the bottom row of the table). Column 1 (Column 4) shows the results of estimating Equation 4 with log total production (log total yield) as the dependent variable, Column 2 (Column 5) adds a time trend specific to inside districts, and Column 3 (Column 6) adds district-specific time trends.
I find that during non-drought periods, the net effect of water reallocation is negative, though not significantly different from zero (Table 4 , first row). During drought periods, the net effect becomes more negative (second row gives the difference in effect, bottom row reports the total net effect during drought periods), though neither the effect during drought periods nor the difference in effect between drought and non-drought periods is significant.
These results are suggestive of the decision amplifying the harmful effects of drought, however, due to the imprecision of the estimates we cannot rule out that the effect of water reallocation is no different between drought and non-drought periods.
Did the redistribution lead to some winners and losers in terms of agricultural productivity, or did it have a uniform effect on all three states? I re-estimate the preceding models allowing the effects of water reallocation to vary by state. Table 5 presents these results. The odd columns use basic difference-in-differences estimation (as in Equation 1), and the even columns control for district-specific trends (as in Equation 3 ). The results in Table 5 indicate that the decision was redistributive-it reduced output and yield in Maharashtra and Karnataka, and increased output and yield in Andhra Pradesh. The decision reduces output by 14.8 log points and yield by 14.0 log points in Maharashtra (Columns 2 and 6, first row), and these estimates are significant at the 10 percent level of significance.
Much of the negative impact of the decision in Maharashtra comes during drought periods.
The bottom of Column 8 indicates that for Maharashtra during drought periods, the water allocation reduced total yield by 24 log points and production decreased by 20 log points (bottom of column 4); both the results are significant at the 5% level. These results of lower productivity especially during drought periods due to the decision is consistent with Maharashtra having to release water downstream at a steady pace, regardless of its own water needs. The gain in output that Andhra Pradesh experiences can be attributed to the discharge results presented in Table 1 -there is a decrease in variance of water flow, and water flow during summer months was higher than expected after the 1976 decision.
Although the estimated effects are not in general significant for Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, the pattern of results in Table 5 suggest a redistribution of water in favor of the downstream state, with the cost borne by upstream neighbors. Such a redistribution may well have been intended by the Tribunal, who were trying to adhere to the equitable appropriations doctrine. However, it is not clear whether reducing overall efficiency and amplifying the harm of droughts for Maharashtra in the magnitudes shown in my tables were the cost the Tribunal was willing to pay for the increased equity-perhaps some of these effects were unintended consequences.
Robustness Checks
Severity of Drought
My analyses thus far have shown that the decision hurts agricultural productivity during drought periods (at least weakly; the estimates are imprecise, so often they are not significant at the conventional levels). However, a potential confounding factor is the severity of droughts in the drought periods. The drought dummy variable I use takes on the value one for 20% of the sample by construction; hence one could argue that the intensity of the drought could vary, and if by chance the post-1976 has a larger share of severe droughts in the inside districts, this could cause large negative estimated effects in output and yield for reasons having nothing to do with the decision. To check if this is indeed the case, I make the following adjustments to my estimations. First, I add a control for severity of drought (an interaction between the drought variable and the rainfall deviation variable) to Equation 3.
This allows for rainfall shock to have a different effect during drought and non-drought periods. Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 of Table 7 report these results. A second way I account for the drought severity is by dropping the worst drought seasons, which I construct as the bottom 5% of the rainfall shock. This precludes the possibility of a few devastating droughts driving the results. Columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 present these results. The estimation results controlling for severity of the drought in these two ways are basically the same as the original results in Table 3 and 4, suggesting that differential severity of droughts is not biasing my estimates of the effect of the water reallocation. Table 7 reports results for the state-wise estimations, and the results are similar to Table 5 . Duflo and Pande (2007) show that dams increase agricultural productivity and reduce susceptibility to rainfall shocks in districts that are downstream from where the dams are built. To the extent that dam construction is correlated with the interaction term "Post*Inside", then the coefficient for this variable would not be interpretable as the effect of the water reallocation, as it could also be capturing effects of dam construction. To address this concern, I control for number of dams using the variable from Duflo and Pande (2007) and my results are basically unchanged.
Other Robustness Checks
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An additional concern is that with a long post-decision time window (my analysis extends from 1971-1999, so the post-decision period is 24 years), there could be other policies, not just the construction of dams, that are correlated with the "Post*Inside" dummy.
Therefore, I narrow the time window around the decision and find qualitatively similar results.
Conclusion
This paper estimates the effect of redistributing water rights among states on agricultural productivity. The 1976 decision of the Krishna Water Dispute Tribunal provides district-time variation in access to water from the Krishna River. I exploit this variation using a difference-in-differences strategy to identify the effect of water reallocation on agricultural productivity. I find that, on net, there is weak evidence that the water reallocation lowers agricultural productivity. I also find that the decision significantly lowered output and yield in Maharashtra, especially during drought periods. Additionally, the decision lowers productivity in Karnataka and raises it in Andhra Pradesh. These state-wise effects taken together clearly indicate that a redistribution away from the two upstream states toward the downstream state.
Various international and Indian doctrines governing the resolution of water disputes have often pushed for "equitable appropriation", i.e., increasing equity amongst parties without compromising much on individual riparian's efficient use of water. My results are consistent with following this principle: equity is improved (downstream party benefits), though there is an efficiency cost. The point estimates suggest a 7.7% decline in output and 5.5% decline in yield (these effect sizes are not economically significant). It is impossible to know whether the entirety of these net productivity losses were part of the tradeoff that the Tribunal intentionally made to gain more equity, or whether at least some of the losses were unintended consequences. However, unintended or not, efficiency losses are associated with the 1976 agreement, and it is worth considering whether there are more efficient ways to improve equity than water reallocation. Evaluating the KWDT's decision is important because the Krishna Basin is a water source for many people and is an important region for agricultural production. However, the external validity of these estimates may be limited.
Each basin is different with respect to its inherent characteristics, but more importantly they Rainfall deviation is the fractional deviation of rainfall from the mean at the district level (over 1971-1999) . Drought is a dummy indicating that the observation is in the bottom quintile of rainfall deviation. Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level and reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficient. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All regressions include year and district fixed effects. Columns (2) and (5) control for linear time trends specific to inside districts. Columns (3) and (6) control for district -specific time trends. The first row of coefficients gives the difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of water reallocation. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficient. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All regressions include year and district fixed effects. . Columns (2) and (5) control for linear time trends specific to inside districts. Columns (3) and (6) control for district -specific time trends. The first row of coefficients gives the effect of water reallocation during non-drought periods, and the second row gives the difference in effect between drought and non-drought periods; the sum of these two coefficients gives the total effect during drought periods, and is reported in the bottom row. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficient. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. AP represents Andhra Pradesh, MH represents Maharashtra, KT represents Karnataka. All regressions also control for year and district fixed effects, inside*drought, post*drought and drought. Even columns also control for district-specific time trends. Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level and reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficient. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) drop the drought observations falling in the lowest 5 percent of rainfall deviation. All regressions also control for year and district fixed effects, and district-specific time trends. and reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficient. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) drop the drought observations falling in the lowest 5 percent of rainfall deviation. All regressions also control for year and district fixed effects, and district-specific time trends.
